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Abstract
This study extends previous research by the authors that focuses on the growing global challenge of affordability. Ballooning public debt burdens are forcing countries around the world to rethink their approaches to procurement decisions. This paper offers a new approach to government vendor selection decisions in major public procurements. A key challenge is for government purchasing agents to select vendors that deliver the best combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels. The mechanism proposed in this paper is a three-stage, multiattribute, sealed-bid procurement auction. It extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place exclusively over attribute bundles. The model reveals benefits in public procurements by defining an alternative in terms of its value to the buyer over a range of possible expenditures, rather than as a single point in budget-value space. This approach leads to some interesting results. In particular, it suggests that in a fiscally constrained environment, the traditional approach of eliminating dominated alternatives could lead to sub-optimal decisions. The final extension of the model explicitly examines the buyer's decision problem under budget uncertainty. The result is in a new metric proposed to evaluate vendors: an expected utility measure of performance.
Introduction
This study focuses on the growing global challenge of affordability. Ballooning public debt is forcing countries around the world to rethink their procurement strategies. Recent congressional testimony urges the DoD to "achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are affordable" (Written testimony of M. Sullivan , 2009). In the absence of profits to guide public procurement decisions, the challenge is to select vendors that deliver the best possible combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels. The public procurement mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute sealed-bid procurement auction with multiple budgets.
The U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (2005) provided guidance in Subpart 14.5 on a two-step procurement process for government agencies:
Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if necessary) discussion of a technical proposal. No pricing is involved.
Step two involves the submission of sealed price bids by those who submitted acceptable technical proposals in step one. Invitations for bids shall be issued only to those offerors submitting acceptable technical proposals in step one. An objective is to permit the development of a sufficiently descriptive and not unduly restrictive statement of the Government's requirements especially useful for complex items.
Blondal (2006) discusses a similar two-stage 1 bidding process, in which the procuring agency issues a general request and then later issues a detailed request based on the responses.
Much of the multiattribute auction literature, including Che (1993) , Beil and Wein (2003) , and Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) , either implicitly or explicitly includes price alongside non-price attributes in the buyer's value/utility function.
2 While this standard approach is appropriate in many private-sector contexts, it generates complications in public procurements such as major defense acquisitions. Unlike the private sector, where the incentive to maximize profits provides a clear objective, the best government decisionmakers can do is to maximize value to the public subject to funding (budget) constraints.
In an application that maximizes value subject to a budget constraint, Michael and Becker (1973) make the case that costs be excluded from measures of value. The authors' focus is on performance and affordability. Vendors compete for a government contract based on their relative costs of producing different components of quality and their unique (sunk) technology investments that define their ability to offer different tradeoffs among these components. A similar approach is known as "cost as an independent variable" (CAIV). Larsen (2007) offers the following explanation of CAIV:
All acquisition programs/issues consist of three fundamental elements: cost, performance and schedule. Under CAIV, performance and schedule are considered a function of cost. Cost and affordability should be a driving force, not an output after potential solutions are established. (p. 15)
Loerch, Koury, and Maxwell (1999) discuss a Value Added Analysis approach for applying multiattribute preferences to optimize the United States Army's force structure under a budget constraint, in accordance with the CAIV concept. The scope of our model differs from theirs, in that we focus on a single acquisition program. This allows us to incorporate vendors' decision-making into the model, along with issues of asymmetric information. In our model, as in theirs, prices and costs do not appear in the buyer's value function. Instead, the buyer provides information about possible budget levels, allowing prices to appear in affordability constraints in the spirit of CAIV.
Budget constraints may not be known when the vendor selection decision is made. Buede and Bresnick (1999) describe the acquisition process as having four major phases and point out that vendor selection occurs in the first phase, while the budget may change throughout the entire process. Two pioneers in defense economics, Hitch and McKean (1967) , advocate determining the maximum effectiveness for a given budget and then examining how each alternative fares under several different budget scenarios. Quade (1989) also advocates evaluating vendor proposals based on a range of possible budgets. This leads to the generation of what we call an "expansion path" for each vendor, which shows how the vendor's proposals change as the budget increases or decreases and thus provides a more complete view of the vendor's ability to provide performance. Our model allows the buyer to offer a set of possible budget levels and solicit vendor proposals for each one, leading to the generation of expansion paths.
Expansion paths reveal valuable information to government procurement agents. Suffering from asymmetric information, buyers have very limited knowledge of the vendors' costs of producing a particular attribute, as well as the technologies (production functions) that combine those attributes into products under consideration. Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) describe the vendors' private information: "Seller costs can be expected to depend on [the] local manufacturing base and sellers can be expected to be well informed about the cost of (upstream) raw materials" (p. 437). The general motivation for constructing the expansion paths is expressed succinctly by Keeney (2004) : "If you do not have the right problem, objectives, alternatives, list of uncertainties, and measures to indicate the degree to which the objectives are achieved, almost any analysis will be worthless" (p. 200). It is imperative in public procurement for alternatives to be adequately described and for any budget uncertainty to be explicitly acknowledged. We emphasize that this can be carried out using a value-focused thinking approach, as discussed by Keeney (1992) and by Parnell (2007) in the context of national defense. That is, it is important for the buyer's evaluation process to be carried out independent of the particular alternatives offered.
In the Model section, we introduce our proposal for a three-stage procurement model. This multiattribute sealed-bid procurement auction emphasizes the use of a value function with exclusively non-price attributes and the specification of a set of possible budget levels. We formulate the decision problems faced by the buyer and the vendors, and discuss various insights derived from the model. We also provide two historical examples of government procurement decisions that likely could have benefited from a more complete formulation of alternatives and specification of uncertainties.
After vendor bids have been solicited for a spectrum of possible budget levels, the Budget Uncertainty section expands the formulation of the buyer's problem to explicitly include the buyer's beliefs of the probability associated with various budget levels. We follow a decision under uncertainty approach as introduced by Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer (1964) . In addition to expressing their beliefs about various budget levels as probabilities, the government buyer specifies a utility function over the value of attribute bundles that incorporates his or her risk attitude, as discussed by Dyer and Sarin (1982) and Matheson and Abbas (2005) . The result is a new metric proposed to evaluate vendors: an expected utility measure of performance.
Model
The procurement agency (the buyer) begins by specifying a multiattribute value function over a set of desired attributes A = {a 1 , …, a n }, as well as a set of (increasing) possible budget levels B = {b 1 , …, b k }. There are m vendors, each of whom will respond in the second stage with a bid. A bid consists of a set of attribute levels that can be produced by a vendor for each of the k possible budget levels. Vendor j's bid can be expressed as k vectors of the form For ease of exposition, we assume ( ) j V A is an additive multiattribute value function similar to that discussed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kirkwood (1997) , although it is later demonstrated the conclusions of the paper do not require ( ) j V A to be additive. The use of additive multiattribute value functions requires the assumption of mutual preferential independence (Dyer & Sarin, 1979; Kirkwood & Sarin, 1980) . This implies that alternatives can be compared exclusively on the set of attributes over which they differ, ignoring levels of other attributes.
For any given budget level, the buyer's objective is as follows: Note that since ( ) j V A is a weighted average of terms between zero and one, it also ranges from zero to one. We assume the buyer has an understanding of the range of attribute levels in determining the weights and that the buyer explicitly shares the weights and the single-attribute value functions. It is necessary for the government buyer to completely specify its preferences to the vendors by providing w i and v i (a ij ) for i = 1, …, n. The final
stage of the model involves applying Equation 1 to the set of vendor bids and the buyer selecting the vendor that yields the highest value.
Given the buyer-determined set of desired attributes A, along with the weights and single-attribute value functions, and the set of possible budget levels B, each vendor produces an attribute bundle to submit to the buyer for each of the k possible budget constraints. Since vendors have private information about their own production capabilities, costs, and profit requirements, each vendor forms his or her own private beliefs about the likelihood of a bid being accepted. 3 We assume that all vendors believe the probability of a bid being accepted is increasing in ( ) j V A for all possible budget levels.
The problem faced by a representative vendor j for an arbitrary budget level b can be expressed as follows:
where C j is the total cost paid by firm j (with the desired profit margin included) to produce a set of single-attribute values. The cost incurred to generate the corresponding attribute bundle cannot exceed b. We assume that C j is increasing in i v for all i and that C j is strictly convex. This condition is not overly restrictive, since it simply implies decreasing returns from vendor investments to improve any individual attribute value. Because the objective function in Equation 2 is linear, given the assumed properties of a representative vendor's cost function, a unique solution (vendor proposal) will exist.
For purposes of illustration, and ease of exposition, the remainder of this study focuses on two vendors and two (non-price) attributes. The two vendors can have different technologies with which to combine the two attributes and may face different costs to improve individual attributes. The Lagrangian function to solve the vendor's problem is given by the following:
Since an improvement in either attribute increases the value of a particular attribute bundle to the buyer, or i V v ∂ ∂ > 0, each vendor will use the total available budget b to produce its attribute bundle proposal. In this case, first order necessary conditions for an optimum are given by the following:
3 For simplicity, we assume that each vendor determines its required profit margin for each possible budget level proposed by the buyer and that these fixed profit margins are incorporated into the attribute bundles offered. We focus on the vendor's decision of how to allocate fixed amounts of funding across the set of attributes to maximize the value provided to the buyer. Although our results do not require any more details of vendor behavior , we believe this would be an interesting avenue for future research. This exploration could be based on a vendor's search for an optimum bidding strategy in a Dutch auction (see McAfee & McMillan, 1987 , or Milgrom, 1989 , which requires a complete formulation of the bidder's beliefs, values, and risk attitude.
where Equation4c simply asserts that the total budget is being used. Solving Equations 4a and 4b yields 
This implies that the optimum strategy for each vendor is to choose a bid that uses the entire budget and for which the two attributes have equal ratios between the weight placed on the attribute by the buyer and the vendor's marginal cost of increasing the value provided by that attribute.
4 With two competing vendors, there will be two bids that can be represented by attribute bundles: ( ) With the buyer's preferences and the vendor's bidding strategy in place, we now demonstrate how a buyer can explore important differences between vendors. Each vendor goes through the process described above for the k different budget estimates, each time producing a bid that satisfies Equation 5 for each of the k possible budgets. This set of bids from a vendor constitutes an expansion path. It tells the buyer precisely how a vendor's bid will change as the budget constraint is relaxed (or tightened). For purposes of illustration, throughout the remainder of the paper, we use a set of six possible budget levels to simulate alternative possible funding constraints: ($5M, $10M, $15M, $20M, $25M, $30M) or simply (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30) .
Consider the following functional form for the cost functions: , , , 0
This particular functional form is separable, in that it consists of the sum of cost functions on the individual attributes. Each individual attribute cost function is increasing and convex, where the exponent ij β in Equation 6 determines the convexity of each = = ==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb==== -415 -= = function. Although the results of the study do not depend on this particular functional form, this offers a relatively simple way to illustrate our expansion path approach to government vendor selection decisions. Figure 1 offers an example of an expansion path. The buyer in this example places a weight of 0.7 on Attribute 1 and 0.3 on Attribute 2. The vendor represented in Figure 1 , whom we will refer to as Vendor 1, faces lower marginal costs to improve Attribute 1 than to improve Attribute 2 at low levels. Specifically, 
Vendor 2 is symmetric in the sense that he or she does not specialize in providing a particular attribute. Any asymmetry in Vendor 2's expansion path is due to the buyer having asymmetric preferences over the two attributes.
Applying the parameters in Equations 7 and 8 results in the expansion paths shown in Figure 2 Figure 2 reveals an interesting dynamic, which relates to one of the key insights of this study. Under optimistic assumptions about future budgets, it is clear that Vendor 1 will be preferred and selected as the winner. At relatively high budgets, Vendor 1 dominates Vendor 2. However, the reverse is true under a more pessimistic budget. Under severe budget constraints (e.g., $5 million), it is clear that Vendor 2 will be preferred and selected as the winner. If a government buyer believes a significant budget cut is possible then selecting a dominant alternative under the optimistic budget scenario (Vendor 1) may be misleading. The dominated alternative (Vendor 2) should not be prematurely eliminated since it may, in fact, end up being the preferred vendor. 
Value by Budget Level
Note. This graph shows the value provided by each vendor's bid for various budget levels.
Related to the expansion paths, the bids illustrated in Figure 3 are piecewise linear curves. We can think of each one as a function expressing the value to the buyer of the attribute bundles each vendor will provide over the range of possible budget levels. We will write this function for vendor j as Ω j (b), defined for all possible budget levels b. Figure 2 is illustrated more clearly in Figure 3 . It is apparent from Figure 3 that Vendor 2 dominates the competition for any positive budget below the switch-point, b < b', while Vendor 1 dominates for any budget above the switchpoint, b > b'. As Quade (1989) also discusses, this observation suggests rethinking the simpler definition of dominance, which refers to points (not functions) in cost-effectiveness space.
The dynamic revealed in
Viewing alternatives as functions in budget-value space reveals that the point-based definition can be misleading. A static comparison that begins by assuming a relatively high fixed budget would eliminate Vendor 2 from further consideration. For example, consider offers from Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 based on optimistic budgets above b'. A technique that focuses on points and not functions would eliminate Vendor 2; yet, Figure 3 indicates that eliminating Vendor 2 prematurely could lead to a less desirable outcome if subsequent budget cuts resulted in an actual budget somewhere in the range of 0 < b < b'. This observation suggests the need for a new approach to government vendor selection decisions.
This switch-point phenomenon occurs as a result of differences in the two vendors' expansion paths. There is nothing unique about the particular functions chosen in our example. The same results can be obtained in many different ways, including with nonadditive forms of the buyer's value function. In fact, non-linear interactions between attributes are likely to magnify this effect.
6
While the approach in this paper involves assessing the expansion paths by soliciting vendors' attribute bundle offers for multiple budgets, it may be possible for a government buyer to obtain similar information by soliciting price bids for multiple sets of performance requirements (i.e., specified attribute levels). This would have the advantage of not requiring the buyer to reveal a value function, but also the corresponding disadvantage of not allowing each vendor the flexibility to achieve the desired values with the least costly combinations of attribute levels. Using either approach, the buyer benefits by being able to incorporate affordability into the decision in a meaningful way when the budget is not known with certainty. In particular, the buyer gains the ability to view each alternative as a function in cost-effectiveness space, rather than as a single point.
Selecting a vendor based on points in cost-effectiveness space can lead to worse outcomes than expected, since there may be uncertainties present that are implicitly ignored. One example is the $8.8 billion U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) contract, which was awarded to Electronic Data System (EDS) in 2000. Wilson (2006) explains that EDS was the lowest bidder and that problems arose due to the scope of EDS' task being much larger than expected by either party. Whether another vendor might have performed better than EDS given the expanded scope is unknown. (See Jordan, 2007 , for more information on NMCI.) A second example is the U.S. Air Force's acquisition of the Boeing (then McDonnell Douglas) C-17 Globemaster III. This aircraft, commonly referred to as the C-17, is used as an airlifter for troops and cargo. McDonnell Douglas' C-17 proposal was selected in 1981, effectively ending the bidding process. However, a dollar amount was not specified until 1986, when the Air Force awarded McDonnell Douglas a $3.39 billion contract. Even after 1986, the C-17 program was subjected to a great deal of change. Kennedy (1999) explains the following:
In addition, how much airlift was required for war plans was largely undefined. Securing necessary funding for the C-17 was simply an ordeal. That the program's funding fell victim to the budget axes wielded by Congress, DoD, and Air Force undermined the ultimate goal-timely operational delivery of the C-17.
As in the NMCI example, it would have been very difficult to foresee the eventual outcome for the C-17 based simply on a cost-effectiveness point when the decision was made.
The sensitivity of vendor selection decisions to different funding scenarios is a fundamental result that arises in a wide variety of government procurement contexts and places a premium on affordability. In a constrained fiscal environment, we strongly recommend the adoption of an expansion path approach to guide government vendor selection decisions.
Budget Uncertainty
A natural extension of the model is to consider a procurement auction in which the buyer assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible budgets. If the buyer believes that the realized budget will be b with probability p(b) or, in the continuous case, that b has a probability density function f(b) then the government vendor selection problem can be examined using a decision under uncertainty approach.
This adds a valuable new layer to the problem: We must now include the buyer's risk attitude, because he or she will be evaluating gambles over multiple possible values. We express risk attitudes through a utility function U, which takes the overall multiattribute value measure as its argument (see Dyer & Sarin, 1982 , or Matheson & Abbas, 2005 . This approach allows us to separate the buyer's attitude toward risk and their strength of preferences over the attributes.
Given a value function V and maximum and minimum achievable values, U can be assessed using simple binary gambles. For example, the buyer could specify an attribute bundle a 0 that provides the minimum value (zero) and an attribute bundle a* that provides the maximum value (one) and then consider a hypothetical gamble in which he or she receives a* with probability p and a 0 with probability 1-p. For any other attribute bundle a', U(V(a')) would simply be the value of p for which the buyer is indifferent between receiving the uncertain gamble and a certain value, a'.
The government buyer's new problem is to select a vendor j to maximize
or, in the continuous case, to maximize
That is, the government buyer maximizes the expected utility provided by the vendor, incorporating both the strength of its preferences over the vendor's attribute bundle proposals, expressed by Ω j , and its risk attitude, expressed by U.
Consider both the buyer and vendors' information used to generate Figure 2 . Recall that the buyer places weights of 0.7 and 0.3 on Attributes 1 and 2, respectively, while individual vendor production and cost characteristics are given by the parameters in Equations 7 and 8). Now suppose the buyer has the exponential utility function 
where, as previously specified, V varies between zero and one over the possible attribute bundles. The function and parameters given by Equation 11 represent a decision-maker who is risk averse. Note that since the minimum value of V is zero and the maximum is one, U(V) also varies between zero and one. Figure 4 illustrates the values and corresponding 
Bid Utilities
Note. This graph shows the buyer's utility function and the value and corresponding utility offered by each vendor for the six budget scenarios in the decision under uncertainty example.
Consider a scenario in which the buyer believes that b 1 , …, b 6 will occur with probabilities 0.1, 0.15, 0.35, 0.25, 0.1, and 0.05, respectively. Given these probabilities for the six budget levels and this particular buyer's preferences, the expected utility if Vendor 1 is selected is 0.771, as opposed to 0.800 if Vendor 2 is selected. While this aggregate result suggests that our buyer should select Vendor 2, disaggregating the vendor selection problem offers additional insights.
The bundle of attributes provided by Vendor 1 would be more desirable for budget levels 15, 20, 25, and 30, one of which is likely to occur with a probability of 0.75. However, in the case of a very low budget, Vendor 1's attribute bundle would be far less desirable. Yet, the expected values of the two bids are nearly identical. Such insights would be nearly impossible to obtain when presented with only a single bid from each vendor for the most likely budget, b = 15. More revealing and robust analysis is only feasible if the buyer solicits bids from the vendors over multiple possible budget levels.
Constructing a gamble over possible overall values is extremely difficult if a vendor's bid consists of only one attribute bundle for a single budget, rather than a set of attribute bundles for multiple budgets. A decision under uncertainty approach requires decisionmakers to place a value on all possible outcomes. The procurement auction framework advocated in this paper ensures that these outcomes are fully specified.
Conclusion
This paper offers a new approach to government vendor selection decisions in major public procurements. The paper describes a simple three-stage, multiattribute procurement process for government vendor selection decisions. It allows the buyer to incorporate the government's preferences over multiple attributes, and it allows each vendor to offer its best possible bid based on the budget estimate for the program and on each vendor's cost structure. The model operationalizes a version of the popular concept of cost as an independent variable (CAIV). The results of this study reveal the importance in the public sector of including costs as part of a budget constraint, rather than incorporating costs directly in the buyer's value and utility function.
The model developed in this paper allows vendors to submit bids for a range of possible budget levels. This leads to the generation of an expansion path for each vendor, which illustrates how each vendor's bid improves as budgets increase. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that a vendor whose bid is dominated at one particular budget level can easily end up being the winner at another budget level. This makes it vital for procurement agencies to rethink traditional public sector bid solicitations. Instead of viewing each vendor as a single point in cost-effectiveness space, it is important for governments to view each vendor as a curve in budget-value space. In economies where affordability is a priority and where budgets are likely to change over time, the approach proposed in this paper can result in better choices for voters and taxpayers since it ensures vendors are not prematurely eliminated from consideration.
Finally, since precise funding levels may not be known with certainty when vendor selection decisions are made, we explicitly model vendor selection as a decision under uncertainty. In this case, the buyer assigns a probability distribution over all possible budgets (funding levels) while a utility function captures the buyer's attitude toward risk. This methodology enables buyers to generate expected utilities from vendor proposals, providing a valuable new approach and metric for government vendor selection decisions.
The approach in this paper can be thought of as a strategic choice of auction mechanism for a buyer when a range of budget authorities for the program can be estimated and products are differentiated and complex. The approach combines the competitive advantages of auctions with the flexibility of decisions based on multiple attributes of a product, all while incorporating considerations of affordability when the budget level is not known with certainty. 
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